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Casenote
Trash: A Matter of Privacy?
I. Introduction
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
governs all searches and seizures conducted by government
agents.' The Supreme Court has placed a person's reasonable
expectation of privacy at the forefront of any Fourth Amend-
ment analysis. 2 A defendant without a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the area searched or the item seized has not been
subjected to a "search" or "seizure" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. Thus, reasonable law enforcement prac-
tices are not required unless they are deemed either searches or
seizures. 3 This casenote will describe the Fourth Amendment
protections and the evolution of the law of warrantless trash
searches, including the elements of the "reasonable expectation
of privacy" test, announced by the Supreme Court in Katz v.
United States.4 Next, it will discuss and criticize the Supreme
Court's decision in California v. Greenwood.5 In Greenwood, the
Court held that when a person puts her trash outside to be
picked up by the garbage collectors, the police may freely search
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. "The right of people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized." The Fourth Amendment is applicable to state offi-
cials through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that "all evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Constitution is ... inadmissible in state court.").
2. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
3. See generally Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment,
58 MiNN. L. REv. 349 (1974).
4. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
5. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
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the trash without a warrant. 6 Part IV will examine various
state court decisions that have rejected Greenwood and instead
have recognized an individual's privacy interest in her trash
pursuant to individual state constitutions. Part V of the case-
note will discuss the Fourth Amendment protection that should
be granted to a person who mixes her trash with others, for ex-
ample, someone who shares a community dumpster or disposes
of trash at her place of employment. Finally, the article will
analogize the disposing of one's trash with other activities that
require individuals to "surrender something" to a third person,
and where such third party disclosure should not, or in fact,
does not eliminate privacy expectations in the information
disclosed.
II. Historical Background
The Fourth Amendment contains two separate clauses: the
prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures by the gov-
ernment; and, the requirement that probable cause support
each warrant issued.7 Probable cause to conduct a search is de-
fined as "a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime will be found in a particular place."8 Traditionally, only
the issuance of a valid search warrant satisfied the reasonable
search and seizure inquiry of the Fourth Amendment analysis.9
However, the Supreme Court has acknowledged instances
where it is not practical for the police to obtain a warrant and,
therefore, excused the warrant requirement in those
situations.10
Until 1967, courts viewed the Fourth Amendment as pro-
tecting certain places, "constitutionally protected areas," not
the individual citizens." The protection of the Fourth Amend-
ment applied only to those places specifically enumerated in the
Constitution, including "persons" (including the bodies and
6. See id.
7. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
8. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 214 (1983).
9. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
10. See, e.g., Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990) (holding that a police of-
ficer can conduct a protective sweep of the premises pursuant to an arrest if there
are articulable facts that would lead a reasonable officer to believe that there is an
individual posing a danger on the premises).
11. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 57-59 (1967).
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clothing of individuals); "houses" (including apartments, hotel
rooms, garages, business offices, stores and warehouses); "pa-
pers" (such as letters); and, "effects" (such as automobiles). 12
In 1967, the Court rejected the rigid "constitutionally pro-
tected area" test that focused only on the places that were being
searched. 13 In Katz v. United States,14 the Supreme Court held
that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.15
"What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his
own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment pro-
tection... [b]ut what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally pro-
tected."16 There, the defendant, Charles Katz, a bookmaker,
was convicted of conducting wagering activities across state
lines in violation of a federal statute. 17 The FBI placed an "elec-
tronic listening and recording device" to the outside of a public
telephone booth that the defendant used to conduct his busi-
ness. 18 The Court of Appeals, over Katz's objection, permitted
the government to introduce transcripts of the overheard con-
versations as evidence against Katz.' 9 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine whether the defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights had been violated. 20
The government argued that since the phone booth, located
in a public place, was constructed partly of glass, the defendant
was as visible to the police inside the booth as if he had re-
mained outside. 21 The Court, however, rejected this argument
and stated that "what [Katz] sought to exclude.., was not the
intruding eye ... [but] the uninvited ear."22 By entering the
phone booth, even though it was a public phone located in a
12. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.1(a), at 380-81 (3d. ed.
1996).
13. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
14. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
15. See id. at 351.
16. Id.
17. See id. at 348.
18. See id.
19. See Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 134-35 (9th Cir. 1966), rev'd 389
U.S. 347 (1967).
20. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 350.
21. See id. at 352.
22. Id.
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public place, shutting the door behind him, and "pay[ing] the
toll," Katz was entitled to assume that the words he spoke
would remain private and not be broadcast publicly.23 Thus,
this law enforcement practice "constituted a 'search and seizure'
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."24
The Katz court adopted a new approach to Fourth Amend-
ment analysis and focused on the protection of the individual as
opposed to location. Although the government argued that
since there was no "physical penetration of the telephone
booth"25 by the police, Fourth Amendment principles should not
apply. The Court rejected these notions of property law as part
of its analysis.26 "[W]e have expressly held that the Fourth
Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible items, but
extends as well to the recording of oral statements overheard
without any 'technical trespass under local property law.'"27
In his famous concurring opinion, Justice Harlan articu-
lated a two-prong test for determining whether a person is enti-
tled to Fourth Amendment protection. First, Justice Harlan's
test required that a person exhibit an actual (subjective prong)
expectation of privacy. 28 Second, the expectation must be one
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective
prong).29 Justice Harlan, in applying his test to the facts of
Katz, would have held that the defendant did have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the phone booth even though it was a
public place. "[I]t is a temporarily private place whose momen-
tary occupants' expectations of freedom from intrusion are rec-
ognized as reasonable."30
III. California v. Greenwood31
In early 1984, the Laguna Police Department received a tip
that a truck filled with illegal drugs was en route to the address
23. See id.
24. Id. at 353.
25. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
26. See id. at 353.
27. Id.
28. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
29. See id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
30. Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
31. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
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of the defendant, William Greenwood.32 In addition to the tip,
the police received information from one of Greenwood's neigh-
bors that there was heavy vehicular traffic late at night in front
of Greenwood's home.33 Police surveillance outside of Green-
wood's home confirmed this report.34 In April of 1984, the police
instructed the local trash collector to pick up the garbage bags
that Greenwood had deposited for collection at the curb in front
of his house and to immediately turn them over.35 The plastic
bags were opaque and had been sealed by Greenwood prior to
their disposal. 36
Over the next few months, the police continued to search
through Greenwood's trash.37 Enough evidence indicative of
narcotics use was discovered to obtain a search warrant of his
home.38 During this search, the police discovered quantities of
cocaine and hashish.39 Greenwood was subsequently arrested
on felony drug charges. 40
The Superior Court of California dismissed the charges
against Greenwood pursuant to the authority of People v.
Krivada.41 The California Court of Appeal affirmed.4 2 The
United States Supreme Court, applying Justice Harlan's two-
prong test announced in Katz, reversed the lower California
courts.4 3 The Supreme Court held that the police are permitted
to conduct warrantless searches of trash left at the curbside.44
Justice White, writing for the majority, concluded that
while Greenwood might have had a subjective expectation of
privacy, it was not an expectation that society was prepared to
32. See id. at 37.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 45.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 37-38.
39. See id. at 38.
40. See id.
41. See Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 38 (citing People v. Krivada, 5 Cal. 3d 357
(1971) (holding that warrantless trash searches violate federal law and the Califor-
nia Constitution)).
42. See Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 38 (citing People v. Krivada, 182 Cal. App. 3d
729 (1986)).
43. See Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 43.
44. See id. at 45.
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recognize as reasonable. 45 In support of this conclusion, the
Court focused on three main factors: first, society recognizes
that garbage left on the street is "accessible to animals, chil-
dren, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public;"46
second, when the defendant left his trash at the curbside for the
garbage collector to take, he renounced control over it;4v and,
third, that "the police cannot be expected to avert their eyes
from evidence of criminal activity that could have been observed
by [the trash collectors or] any [other] member of the public."48
The Court, in making its decision, also relied on the expectation
of privacy analysis used in Smith v. Maryland.49 There, the
Supreme Court held that a person does not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the telephone numbers that she dials
from her home telephone because she is voluntarily conveying
that information to a third party.50 The release of that informa-
tion to the telephone company, according to the Court, was
enough to eliminate any privacy interests a person might have
in protecting the identity of the people that she calls.51 Thus,
she received no Fourth Amendment protection.52 Similarly, the
majority in Greenwood held that a person who places her trash
at the curbside for the garbage collectors relinquishes any pri-
vacy expectation in its contents, and thus, would not receive
any Fourth Amendment protection in a subsequent search.53
Justice Brennan, writing for the dissent in Greenwood,
stated: "I suspect. . . members of our society will be shocked to
learn that the Court, the ultimate guarantor of liberty, deems
unreasonable our expectation that the aspects of our private
lives that are concealed safely in a trash bag will not become
public."5 4
The conclusion of the Supreme Court in Greenwood is at
odds with "commonly accepted notions of civilized behavior."55
45. See id. at 40-41.
46. Id. at 40.
47. See id. at 40-41.
48. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 41.
49. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
50. See id. at 742.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 745-46.
53. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988).
54. Id. at 45-46 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 45 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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First, even though one's garbage might be accessible to animals
or children, it does not follow that the police have an unregu-
lated right to search it. "We expect officers of the State to be
more knowledgeable and respectful of people's privacy than are
dogs and curious children."56 Most individuals would be out-
raged to find a neighbor searching through their trash. Assum-
ing Justice Brennan's assertion is correct, there must be a
cognizable societal expectation of privacy in our garbage. "If
one has not abandoned the right of privacy in his trash to his
neighbor, he certainly has not abandoned it to persons involved
in law enforcement."5 7
Trash contains information concerning intimate aspects of
a person's life: a person's eating habits, what newspapers or
magazines she reads or subscribes to, what associations she be-
longs to, what credit cards she owns, her financial status ac-
cording to bank records, what stores she shops in, intimate
details of her sexual practices, matters of her personal hygiene,
whom she speaks to on the telephone, what music she listens to
- details that essentially reveal the innermost aspects of a per-
son's private life.58 In a vast number of situations, people want
to keep their habits and preferences private. Almost every daily
activity will result in some form of refuse. In a person's trash,
one could find evidence of a person's darkest secrets - informa-
tion that she would never voluntarily share with another per-
son. As Justice Brennan stated in Greenwood, "it cannot be
doubted that a sealed trash bag harbors telling evidence of the
'intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man's home
and the privacies of life,' which the Fourth Amendment is
designed to protect."5 9 This information is conveyed to the gar-
bage collector for the purpose of eliminating it from one's life -
forever.
Second, a person often has no alternative means to elimi-
nate her trash. In Greenwood, the county where the defendant
lived had an ordinance that required residents to dispose of
56. State v. Schultz, 388 So. 2d 1326, 1330 (Fla. App. 1980) (Anstead, J.,
dissenting).
57. Id. at 1331 (Anstead, J., dissenting).
58. See Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 50 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 50-51 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
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their trash through the county sanitation system at least once a
week.60 Other means of disposal, including burning the trash or
even allowing it to accumulate in one's own garage, were
strictly prohibited by the ordinance.61 Since local laws and so-
cial customs gave rise to this mandatory system of garbage re-
moval, society should expect that people would retain their
privacy interests in such items affected by the system.62 Justice
Brennan stated that "the Court paints a grim picture of our so-
ciety."63 It depicts a society where "local authorities may com-
mand their citizens to dispose of their personal effects in the
manner least protective of the 'sanctity of the home and priva-
cies of life,' and then monitor them arbitrarily and without judi-
cial oversight .. ".."64
Third, Greenwood was careful to protect his "stuff' from the
view of outsiders by using opaque, sealed bags.65 Thus, the
Court's belief that the police cannot be reasonably expected to
"avert their eyes from evidence of criminal activity that could
have been observed by any member of the public" 66 was not ap-
plicable to Greenwood since there was nothing in Greenwood's
trash that was visible. "The majority mistakenly interprets ex-
posure of the outside of the container as public exposure of the
contents."67 Conversely, Greenwood did everything in his power
to keep the contents of his garbage private. "By sealing the con-
tainers in a secure manner and placing the containers on his
own property, the owner has done everything within his own
means to insure the privacy of the contents thereof, short of de-
livering the containers to a central disposal site himself."68
Courts have recognized instances where a sealed container
does prevent police from conducting a search without a war-
rant. In United States v. Chadwick,69 the Court held that an
60. See Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 54-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
61. See id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
62. See generally Madeline A. Herdrich, Note, California v. Greenwood: The
Trashing of Privacy, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 993 (1989).
63. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 55 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 55-56 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
65. See id. at 45 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 41.
67. Herdrich, supra note 62, at 1015.
68. State v. Schultz, 388 So. 2d 1326, 1330 (Fla. App. 1980) (Anstead, J.,
dissenting).
69. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
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individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a package
or container, specifically, a footlocker located in an open trunk
of a car.70 There, the defendants arrived in Boston by train
from San Diego and were arrested at their waiting automo-
bile.7 1 Federal narcotics agents were alerted by Amtrak officials
in San Diego that they had observed the defendants loading a
brown footlocker that looked unusually heavy and that was
leaking talcum powder.7 2 Since these observations matched the
profile of possible drug traffickers, the Amtrak officials in San
Diego notified their Boston counterparts. 73 The agents did not
obtain either a search or arrest warrant, yet they had a dog
trained to detect drugs with them.74 The suspects were later
arrested.7 5 The agents opened the footlocker without the de-
fendants' consent and found large amounts of marijuana
inside.7 6
"[Tihe government argue[d] that only homes, offices, and
private communications implicate interests which lie at the core
of the Fourth Amendment." 77 According to the government's po-
sition, since none of these constitutionally protected areas were
implicated, lawfulness of this search or seizure should not turn
on whether police had a warrant but rather only on whether the
police had probable cause to believe that evidence of criminal
conduct was present.78 The Court rejected this argument and
relied upon the holding in Katz that the Fourth Amendment
"protects people, not places." 79 The Court stated that luggage
typically contains an individual's personal effects and thus
should be granted a high level of Fourth Amendment protec-
tion, even though the defendants carried the luggage in a public
place.80 Further, the Court stated that "luggage contents are
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id. at 3 (noting that talcum powder is a substance often used to mask
the odor of marihuana or hashish).
73. See id. at 1.
74. See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 4.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. Id. at 7.
78. See id.
79. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 7 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351
(1967)).
80. See id. at 13.
2000] 549
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not open to public view ... luggage is intended as a repository of
personal effects."8 ' Thus, the police must have a warrant in or-
der to lawfully conduct such a search.
Unfortunately for members of our society, a person does not
have the ability to protect her trash from intrusive police exam-
ination. Even if a person takes the additional step of shredding
her trash into small pieces in order to ensure that it is not rec-
ognizable, she still will not be deemed to have a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in it. In United States v. Scott,82 the
defendant shredded his tax documents into minute strips, yet
the police were permitted to seize them, piece them together
and use the information without obtaining a warrant. 83 The de-
fendant argued that by shredding the trash, he had exhibited
an "objectively reasonable expectation of privacy."84 However,
the court rejected this argument. It held that, although the de-
fendant's attempt to destroy the documents exhibited his sub-
jective intention to keep the contents of his trash private, "the
trash was left for collection in a public place and over which its
producer had relinquished possession."85 The court concluded
that the defendant's act of placing the trash at the curb
amounted to a relinquishment of any expectation of privacy in
the trash because he placed it in the public domain. 86 Short of
allowing the garbage to build up in his home, the court in Scott
left no means for a person to keep the contents of his trash pri-
vate. The court analogized the defendant in that case to a per-
son who attempts to have a private conversation in a public
place where others might overhear the conversation.8 7 There,
the person must accept the "obvious risk" that another person
might overhear.88 However, the court's analogy disregards the
fact that a person who places his shredded garbage outside for
removal is not exposing its contents to the public, but rather
making every attempt to keep them private.
81. Id.
82. 975 F.2d 927 (1st Cir. 1992).
83. See id.
84. Id. at 928.
85. Id. at 929.
86. See id.
87. See Scott, 975 F.2d at 930.
88. Id.
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In contrast, a person who speaks too loudly or is not aware
of others standing around her, is not attempting to keep her
conversation private. Similarly, simply because an activity em-
anates from within the home does not automatically give the
activity constitutional protection. If, for example, a person
blasts her music in the middle of the night or if there are suspi-
cious screams coming from inside her home, she cannot reason-
ably expect to be protected by the Fourth Amendment. There,
the person is exposing those sounds to the public and is no
longer seeking to preserve them as private. Thus, even though
Katz was using a public phone booth located in a public place,
he was still granted the protection of the Fourth Amendment.8 9
The focus of the Court was whether a person was knowingly
exposing information to the public or attempting to keep it pri-
vate, irrespective of the location where the information was
coming from.
IV. State Court Decisions that Declined to Follow Greenwood
Since 1988, several states have provided greater privacy
protections for their citizens pursuant to individual state consti-
tutions than Greenwood provided under the Fourth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution.
In State v. Hempele,90 the Supreme Court of New Jersey
held that a person does have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the garbage she leaves at the curbside. 91 The Hempeles'
home was "one of about ten attached row houses, each [having]
its own front entrance."92 The trash was located next to a flight
of stairs leading to defendants' home.93 The state police were
told by a confidential informant "that [the] defendants, Conrad
and Sharon Hempele, were distributing illicit drugs from their
home" and that the informant had seen a large amount of drugs
in Conrad's bedroom. 94 Based on this information, a state
trooper removed garbage from the front of the Hempeles'
89. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
90. 576 A.2d 793 (N.J. 1990).
91. See id.
92. Id. at 796.
93. See id.
94. See id.
20001
11
PACE LAW REVIEW
home.9 5 Two weeks later, the trooper seized more trash, each
time removing the plastic bag from a plastic garbage can.9 6
Upon searching the trash, the police found traces of marijuana,
cocaine and methamphetamine.9 7
The Hempele court applied a slightly different test from
that of the Supreme Court in Katz.98 The court rejected the first
part of Justice Harlan's test in Katz, requiring an actual or sub-
jective expectation of privacy.9 9 Despite the similarities be-
tween the United States Constitution and the New Jersey State
Constitution, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that a de-
fendant's "actual (subjective) expectation of privacy does not de-
termine the New Jersey Constitution's restraints on the State's
power to search and seize."100 The court envisioned a situation
where the government could simply eliminate a citizen's actual
expectation of privacy by announcing on television that various
private homes located in a certain area were going to be sub-
jected to warrantless searches. 101 Thus, an individual in that
area could no longer claim that she believed that she had an
actual expectation of privacy since the government just in-
formed her otherwise. 0 2 "In such circumstances ... those sub-
jective expectations obviously could play no meaningful role in
ascertaining what the scope of Fourth Amendment protection
was."'
0 3
The New Jersey Constitution requires only that "an expec-
tation of privacy be reasonable." 0 4 The court determined that
reasonable "expectations of privacy are established by general
social norms." 105 In applying that standard, the court first
asked "whether it was reasonable for a person to want to keep
the contents of his . . . [trash] private."10 6 The answer, accord-
95. See Hempele, 576 A.2d at 796.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 801.
99. See id.
100. Hempele, 576 A.2d at 801.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. Id. (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)).
104. Hempele, 576 A.2d at 802.
105. Id. (citing Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 428 (1981)).
106. Hempele, 576 A.2d at 802.
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ing to the court, was "yes."10 7 The court focused on the secrets
that refuse can disclose - including, but not limited to, "infor-
mation revealing intimate details about sexual practices, health
and hygiene . .. [a person's] financial and professional status,
political.., inclinations, [and] private thoughts . -.o1 Accord-
ing to the court, most people rarely, if ever, expose this informa-
tion to the public and do have an interest in keeping these
matters private. 10 9 "Undoubtedly many would be upset to see a
neighbor or stranger sifting through their garbage, perusing
their discarded mail, reading their bank statements, looking at
their empty pharmaceutical bottles, and checking receipts to
see what videotapes they rent."" 0
In State v. Boland,"' the Supreme Court of Washington re-
jected Greenwood pursuant to its state constitution, which ex-
plicitly protects a citizen's "private affairs." 1 2 There, the local
police and the prosecutor's office received an anonymous tip
that the defendant was distributing legend drugs. 1 3 This tip, in
the form of a letter, also contained a brochure that listed the
names of both Health West Products and Brad Boland." 4 When
the police officer attempted to order drugs, the defendant sent a
letter stating that he did not understand the officer's request. 115
Months later, the police began a series of four warrantless
searches of the defendant's garbage in order to find enough evi-
dence to enable them to obtain a warrant to search Boland's
home. 116 Prior to each search, the police observed Boland put-
ting his garbage in the outside trash bin for collection, securing
the can with both a form-fitting lid and a heavy piece of wood
that he placed on top of the lid. 1 7 During at least three of the
107. See id. at 803.
108. Id.
109. See id.
110. Id.
111. 800 P.2d 1112 (Wash. 1990).
112. See id. Wahington Constitution Article 1 § 7 provides: "No person shall
be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law."
WASH. CONST. art. 1 § 7.
113. See Boland, 800 P.2d at 1113 (defining "legend drugs" as those which
federal law prohibits the distribution of without a prescription from a physician).
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id.
20001 553
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warrantless searches, the police found evidence of drug-related
activity.""
The court held that Boland's "private affairs were unrea-
sonably intruded upon."119 While the court agreed that it might
be reasonable to expect that scavengers or animals might in-
vade the garbage, it is not unreasonable for the average person
to believe that her garbage will be free from governmental in-
trusion.120 In support of its conclusion, the court cited numer-
ous local ordinances that served to regulate trash collection and
provide citizens with a reasonable expectation that their trash
would not be picked up or looked through by anyone except for
the local trash collectors.' 21 For example, one local ordinance
required citizens to place their trash in locations "where they
will be convenient for the collector."122 Another example cited
by the court was a Seattle ordinance that made it unlawful for
"anyone other than the owner of a trash can, or one authorized
by the owner to place objects in the can, to remove its contents,
except for collection." 23 Based on these ordinances, the court
concluded that a person could have reasonably inferred that her
trash would be free from handling by anyone other than trash
collectors. 124 "It would be improper to require that in order to
maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in one's trash,
that the owner must forego use of ordinary methods of trash
collection." 125 The Washington Supreme Court recognized the
vital role that the process of trash collection plays in our soci-
ety. 26 "The proper and regulated collection of garbage, as evi-
denced by the ordinances such as [those cited above] . . . is...
necessary to the proper functioning of a modern society .... ,,127
Although State v. Boland held that people do have a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in their trash, police will not be
required to avert their eyes from possible illegal activity when
118. See Boland, 800 P.2d at 1113.
119. Id. at 1116.
120. See id.
121. See id. at 1114.
122. Id. (quoting Port Townsend Municipal Ordinance 6.04.030).
123. Boland, 800 P.2d at 1114 (quoting Seattle Municipal Ordinance
21.36.100).
124. See id. at 1116.
125. Id. at 1115.
126. See id. at 1117.
127. Id.
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evidence is exposed to them. Thus, in State v. Graffius, 28 the
court held that an officer's intentional look into the defendant's
partially open garbage can did not constitute a search within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and thus was not an
unreasonable intrusion into the defendant's privacy. 129 There,
the narcotics detectives received a tip from the FBI that Graf-
fius was growing marijuana.130 Since the detectives did not
have enough information to obtain a search warrant, they de-
cided to conduct a "knock and talk."131 When the officers ap-
proached Graffius' home, they knocked loudly on both the front
and side doors but received no response. 132 Meanwhile, one of
the officers saw two garbage cans located next to the side
door.133 The lid was ajar on one of the cans, creating an opening
about six to eight inches wide. 134 The detective looked inside
the can and saw a "fist-sized bud of marijuana on top of a few
pieces of household garbage." 35 The officer stated that "he was
not visually searching when he walked by... [t]he marijuana
was 'clearly visible' about two-thirds of the way down in the
can." 36 According to the court, "when a law enforcement officer
is able to detect something by utilization of one or more of his
senses while lawfully present at the vantage point where those
senses are used, that detection does not constitute a 'search'
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." 37
The court held that the officer did not act in an unlawful
manner for several reasons. First, he was at the premises on
official police business and the path that he took to get to the
garbage cans was a "normal one for an ordinary member of the
public attempting to see if someone was home." 38 Second, the
128. 871 P.2d 1115 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).
129. See id.
130. See id. at 1116.
131. Id. at 1116 (defining a "knock and talk" as "uniform officers going to a
specific address in an attempt to contact the occupant. If he answers, they tell him
that they are investigating and ask if they can enter and talk to him. If the occu-
pant refuses, they leave.") Id.
132. See Graffius, 871 P.2d at 1116.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1116-17.
137. Id. at 1117 (quoting State v. Seagull, 632 P.2d 44 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981)).
138. Graffius, 871 P.2d at 1118.
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officer did not spy into the residence in any way nor did he act
in any secretive manner.139 Most important, the officer did not
conduct a search because he did not remove the lid, shine a
flashlight down it, nor did he create an artificial vantage point
from which to look from.140 Unlike in Boland, where the police
took affirmative steps in order to uncover the evidence, the po-
lice officer in Graffius simply looked into the opening created by
Graffius himself. Conversely, the defendant in Boland made a
conscious attempt to conceal his trash by placing it in a can
with a form-fitting lid and laying an additional piece of heavy
wood on top of the can.141 The court in Graffius stated that "[an
officer should not be expected to walk around with blinders
on." 142 Thus, the officer's conduct did not violate Graffius' right
to be free from unreasonable intrusions under Art. 1, § 7 of the
Washington Constitution. 143
V. Is There a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy if One
Person's Trash is Mixed with Another's?
The mere fact that one person lives in an apartment build-
ing, and another person owns a home, should not weaken their
constitutional rights. Thus, the use of a common trash recepta-
cle as a means of disposing of one's garbage does not eliminate a
person's Fourth Amendment protection. The ownership of prop-
erty alone should not determine whether a warrantless search
is reasonable. Even if a person's trash is not located directly at
the end of her driveway or next to her garage, she should still be
entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy in it. The pri-
mary distinction between those who live in an apartment and
must use community trash receptacles and those who live in a
single-family home and dispose of trash at the curbside, is the
knowledge that other people will use those community trash re-
ceptacles to discard of their trash as well. Therefore, tenants in
an apartment building have no greater reason to expect that
their trash will be searched by police officers than do people who
live in single-family homes.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See State v. Boland, 800 P.2d 1112, 1113 (Wash. 1990).
142. Graffius, 871 P.2d at 1119.
143. See supra note 112.
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Most importantly, the fact that a person lives in an apart-
ment instead of a house does not change the fact that the pri-
vate remnants of her daily activities can still be found within
her trash. As stated in Katz, "what [a person] seeks to preserve
as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be con-
stitutionally protected."1" Here, when a person discards pri-
vate material into the dumpster, regardless of whether the
dumpster is located at the end of her driveway or in the parking
lot of her apartment building, she does not expose its contents
to the public. Rather, she is discarding the contents for the
trash collector to pick up. A person maintains a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in that trash because it contains informa-
tion about the most intimate details of her life, irrespective of
the fact that it might be located in a place that is possibly acces-
sible to others. Further, the fact that numerous bags of trash
are mixed together in one large receptacle does not eliminate
the possibility of linking each bag to its original owner. Most
trash bags contain some form of a "person identifier" - a piece
of mail with a name and address, a bill or bank statement, a
school paper or work memo. Thus, a tenant in an apartment
building should not be without Fourth Amendment protections
solely because she had no other choice but to share a trash re-
ceptacle with her neighbors.
The Vermont Constitution 145 protects a person from a war-
rantless search of her trash even if she lives in an apartment
building and discards her trash on a curb along with other ten-
ants. In State v. Morris, 46 the police were notified by a confi-
dential informant that the defendant was selling marijuana out
of his apartment. 47 On the regularly scheduled trash collection
day, the police went to the defendant's apartment building and
seized the five or six bags that had been set out for collection by
numerous people who lived in this apartment building. 48 From
the exterior of the bags alone, there was no way to identify
144. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
145. Chapter 1, Article 11 states that "the people have a right to hold them-
selves, their houses, papers, and possessions, free from search and seizure." VT.
CONST. Chap. I art. XII.
146. 680 A.2d 90 (Vt. 1996).
147. See id. at 92.
148. See id.
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which bags belonged to which tenant.149 However, once the po-
lice searched through each bag, they were able to connect the
defendant with illegal drug activity based on various pieces of
discarded mail that revealed his identity.150 The police subse-
quently obtained a warrant to search Morris' apartment, and
upon doing so, found several ounces of marijuana.15'
The court held that the warrantless police search violated
the Vermont State Constitution. 52 In doing so, the court explic-
itly rejected any distinction between people who live in a single-
family dwelling and apartment dwellers. Justice Dooley, in his
dissenting opinion, argued that if a person wants to keep his
trash private, he always has the option of moving to another
location. 53 However, the majority stated that this suggestion
"makes the incredible assumption that all persons could afford
a single-family home ... [miany people live in apartments be-
cause they cannot afford their own homes... [miaking the pro-
tection of Article 11 contingent on factors that hinge on a
person's financial status is unacceptable." 54
In State v. Tanaka, 55 the Supreme Court of Hawaii held
that society is prepared to recognize a person's actual expecta-
tion of privacy in his trash at his place of employment. 56 There,
the defendant approached a confidential informant about bet-
ting on football games. 57 The informant placed numerous bets
with the defendant. 58 All of the contacts between the defend-
ant and the informant occurred at the defendant's place of
work, Granger Pacific. 59 The police officer then trespassed onto
the private property of Granger Pacific, searched the Granger
Pacific trash bin, and while doing so, discovered betting slips in
opaque, closed trash bags. 160
149. See id. at 93.
150. See id.
151. See Morris, 680 A.2d at 93.
152. See id.
153. See id. at 106 (Dooley, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 95 n.3.
155. 701 P.2d 1274 (Haw. 1985).
156. See id.
157. See id. at 1275.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See Tanaka, 701 P.2d at 1275.
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The court, applying the two-part Katz test, found that the
defendant did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
garbage he disposed of at work. 161 First, the court stated that
since the defendant placed his garbage in opaque, closed trash
bags, he did exhibit a reasonable expectation of privacy in it.162
Second, the court held that since a person's trash can reveal so
many details about his life, society is prepared to recognize
these individual subjective privacy expectations as reason-
able. 163 "People reasonably believe that police will not indis-
criminately rummage through their trash bags to discover their
personal effects . . . [blusiness records, bills, correspondence,
magazines, tax records, and other telltale refuse can reveal
much about a person's activities, associations, and beliefs." 16 4
According to the court, to hold otherwise would grant police un-
fettered discretion to search everyone's trash and enable them
to gain access to much private information. 165 "It is exactly this
type of overbroad governmental intrusion that article I, § 7 of
the Hawaii Constitution was intended to prevent." 66
However, in Smith v. State, 67 the Supreme Court of Alaska
upheld a warrantless search of an apartment building dump-
ster. 68 There, a state trooper received information that the de-
fendant was involved in narcotics activities and subsequently
instituted a stakeout of the apartment complex where the de-
fendant lived. 6 9 The trooper ordered the officers to remove gar-
bage placed in the dumpster by Charles Smith. 70 On several
occasions the officers removed bags of garbage from the dump-
ster after they saw Charles Smith throw them in.' 7' Evidence
found in the bags was introduced at trial. 72
161. See id. at 1276.
162. See id.
163. See id. at 1276-77.
164. Id.
165. See Tanaka, 701 P.2d at 1277.
166. Id.
167. 510 P.2d 793 (Alaska 1973).
168. See id. at 795.
169. See id. at 794.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. See Smith, 510 P.2d at 794. Smith lived with another person and the
police were also instructed to remove any garbage that this person threw into the
dumpster as well. See id.
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The Supreme Court of Alaska declined to announce a gen-
eral rule relating to the gathering of a person's trash. 173 How-
ever, they determined that under these facts, the defendant did
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the trash he
threw in a community dumpster. The court concluded that
since the dumpster accommodated several different apart-
ments, other people in the building, including the building su-
perintendent, would be looking into it when they discarded
their own trash. 174 Furthermore, since the dumpster was lo-
cated outside the building in the parking area, it would be rea-
sonable to conclude that the garbage might be removed by
passing cars or a tenant from another apartment. 175 Thus, the
court held that it could not deny police open access to garbage
that could be so easily had by many others. 7 6 The court also
incorporated the property law concept of abandonment into its
analysis, even though the Supreme Court in Katz specifically
rejected this concept in identifying Fourth Amendment protec-
tions.1 77 There, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment
"protected people, not places."178 However, the Supreme Court
of Alaska returned to property law in its holding that "the se-
quence of an individual's placing an article in a receptacle, from
which routine municipal collections are made, and then with-
drawing from the area, as activity clearly indicative of 'an inten-
tion to relinquish all title, possession, or claim to property.""' 79
VI. Do Situations that Require People to Divulge
Information to a Third Party Necessarily Eliminate a
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in that Information?
When a person conveys information to a third party for a
specific purpose, it is reasonable for that person to expect that
the information will only be used in connection with that lim-
ited purpose. However, in Smith v. Maryland,80 the Supreme
173. See id. at 795.
174. See id.
175. See Smith, 510 P.2d at 798.
176. See id. at 799.
177. See supra Part II.
178. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
179. Smith, 510 P.2d at 795 (defining the property law concept of
abandonment).
180. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
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Court upheld a warrantless installation of a pen register by the
telephone company upon police request, in order for the police
to gain access to the numbers that the defendant was dialing
from his home telephone. 181 There, the victim of a robbery gave
the police a description of the robber and of a 1975 automobile
she noticed near the scene of the crime. 8 2 After the robbery,
the victim received threatening phone calls, including one
which told her to go out onto her front porch, and upon doing so,
she saw the same 1975 automobile driving slowly past her
home. 83 She recorded the license plate number and the police
subsequently learned that the car was registered to the defend-
ant.l' 4 The police, without a warrant to do so, instructed the
telephone company to place a pen register 185 at its central of-
fices in order to record the numbers dialed from Smith's
home. 8 6 The Court applied Justice Harlan's Katz test and de-
termined that the defendant did not have a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in the telephone numbers he dialed.8 7 Justice
Blackmun, writing for the majority, held that people do not
"generally entertain any actual expectation in the numbers they
dial... [since] all telephone users realize that they must 'con-
vey' phone numbers to the telephone company .... 188 In addi-
tion, according to the majority, all telephone users are aware
that the telephone numbers they dial result in a permanent rec-
ord - their phone bill. 8 9 Finally, the court noted that most
telephone books alert consumers to the fact that telephone
records assist the telephone company in identifying annoying or
troublesome phone calls made to the subscriber. 90 Thus, since
people are aware of the numerous legitimate business purposes
181. See id.
182. See id. at 737.
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 736. Pen registers and similar devices are fre-
quently used by telephone companies for the purposes of checking billing opera-
tions and preventing violations of the law. Pen registers obtain the local telephone
numbers that the subscriber dials. Such devices do not enable anyone to hear any
of the communications transmitted. See id.
186. See id. at 737.
187. See id. at 742.
188. Id.
189. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 742.
190. See id.
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for which these numbers are used, they cannot possibly main-
tain a legitimate expectation of privacy in them.191
More broadly, the Court held that even if a person did have
that expectation, society is not prepared to accept that expecta-
tion as reasonable. According to Justice Blackmun, "a person
has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information volunta-
rily turned over to third parties." 192 The majority held that once
Smith dialed those numbers, thereby exposing them to the tele-
phone company, "[he] assumed the risk that the company would
reveal to the police the numbers he dialed."193 Thus, the Court
concluded that the installation and use of the pen register was
not a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
and therefore that no search warrant was required. 94
In light of the most recent technology, including caller iden-
tification devices, the Court's opinion can result in an invasion
of privacy in the lives of people who do not "voluntarily expose"
anything to the telephone company. For example, if a person
has a caller identification device and the phone company can
tap into her phone line and gain access to the caller identifica-
tion, the government could learn the names and numbers of
those who called her, without her revealing or exposing any in-
formation to the public.
In a similar case, United States v. Miller,195 the Supreme
Court held that a bank depositor has no legitimate expectation
of privacy with respect to any deposit slips or checks that he
"voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employ-
ees ... the depositor takes the risk in revealing his affairs to
another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to
the Government." 196 There, the defendant was suspected of
committing various federal offenses. The government ordered
the bank where the defendant maintained his accounts to pro-
duce the defendant's bank records, including all checks, deposit
slips, two financial statements, and three monthly state-
ments.197 The Court held that the defendant had no legitimate
191. See id.
192. Id. at 743-44.
193. See id. at 744.
194. Smith, 442 U.S. at 746.
195. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
196. Id. at 442-43.
197. See id. at 438.
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privacy interest in those records because the defendant volunta-
rily exposed this information to a third party - the bank. 98
The conclusions in both of the above Supreme Court deci-
sions are at odds with the way most people conduct their day-to-
day affairs. First, in order for a person to efficiently conduct her
business, it becomes critical for her to make use of both the tele-
phone and the bank. The telephone serves as one of the pri-
mary sources of communication. People use their telephone in
order to connect with virtually everyone, including, but not lim-
ited to, business associates, doctors, friends and relatives. Simi-
larly, a bank is a place where most people keep or invest their
money. People use a bank as both a safe place to hold their
money, and a mechanism for possibly increasing the amount
that they have through various investments or accounts.
"[Ulnless a person is prepared to forego use of what for many
has become a personal or professional necessity, he cannot help
but accept the risk of surveillance ... it is idle to speak of 'as-
suming' risks in context where, as a practical matter, individu-
als have no realistic alternative." 199
Second, as in Greenwood, a person reveals this information
to specific third parties for a specific purpose. In Miller, that
purpose is to maintain necessary personal and business con-
tacts with the outside world via the telephone or to conduct
their banking. In Greenwood, the defendant put his trash at
the curb in order to dispose of it to the trash collectors. None of
these disclosures should amount to a blanket relinquishment of
Fourth Amendment protection, so long as the person takes rea-
sonable steps to ensure that the information is only being trans-
mitted to its intended third party.
Third, both telephone records and bank statements reveal a
great deal of private information about a person's life - includ-
ing whether she is a member of any political associations, what
doctors she speaks to, whether she might be having an affair,
which bank she uses, how much money she has, who her friends
or business associates are, and perhaps, depending on her pro-
fession, various sources that she is obligated to keep confiden-
198. See id. at 443.
199. Smith, 442 U.S. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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tial.20 0 According to Katz, that information is exactly what the
Fourth Amendment protects - the information that people
"seek to preserve as private."201 As Justice Stewart stated in his
dissenting opinion in Smith v. Maryland, "the numbers dialed
from a private telephone - although certainly more prosaic than
the conversation itself - are not without 'content.'" 20 2
Fourth, the disclosure of this information to the telephone
company or the bank should not automatically entitle the police
to gain unlimited access to it. These numbers are being re-
corded by the telephone company for specific business purposes.
"Privacy is not a discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or
not at all. Those who disclose certain facts to a bank or phone
company for a limited business purpose need not assume that
this information will be released to other persons for other
purposes."20 3
The law has recognized other instances where the "volun-
tary disclosure" of information is protected against governmen-
tal intrusion. For example, the attorney-client privilege
protects all voluntary disclosures, with very narrow exceptions,
made by a client to her lawyer. Similarly, a patient is entitled
to maintain an expectation of privacy in the information she
shares with her doctor.20 4 Likewise, it is a federal offense pun-
ishable with fines and imprisonment, to take any "letter, postal
card, or package out of any post office or any authorized deposi-
tory .. . before it has been delivered to the person to whom it
was directed ... or to pry into the business or secrets of another,
or opens, secretes, embezzles, or destroys the same . ..."2o5 In
those instances, even though a person has voluntarily "exposed"
information to a third party, she still maintains a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the information so exposed. Further-
more, in each of those instances, the person has taken some af-
200. "Permitting governmental access to telephone records on less than prob-
able cause may thus impede certain forms of political affiliation and journalistic
endeavor that are the hallmark of a truly free society." Smith, 442 U.S. at 751
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
201. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
202. Smith, 442 U.S. at 748 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
204. Gregory E. Sopkin, The Police Have Become our Nosy Neighbors: Florida
v. Riley and Other Supreme Court Deviations From Katz, 62 U. COLO. L. REv. 407,
413-14 (1991).
205. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1702.
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firmative step to keep the information private by directing it
very specifically to its intended recipient. Similarly, the defend-
ant in Greenwood took affirmative steps to protect the contents
of his trash by placing the trash in opaque plastic bags, tying
the bags shut and placing them at the curb so they could be
picked up by the trash collectors. Thus, Greenwood should have
received Fourth Amendment protection for the personal con-
tents of those bags.
Various state courts have rejected the Supreme Court's
conclusion that a person relinquishes any reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in information he voluntarily reveals to a third
party. In State v. Hunt,20 6 the Supreme Court of New Jersey
held that an individual maintains a protected privacy interest
in phone records that contain the long distance numbers dialed
from his telephone. 2 7 There, acting on a tip, police went to the
office of New Jersey Bell Telephone Company and obtained
Hunt's home toll billing records covering a specific period of
time.208 The phone records revealed evidence of gambling
activity.209
The Hunt court explicitly rejected the analysis of the
Supreme Court under Smith v. Maryland.210 First, the court ac-
knowledged the vital role that the telephone plays in everyday
life in our modern society: "It has become part and parcel of the
home."21' The court applied the analysis used by the majority
in Katz, concluding that a telephone caller is "entitled to as-
sume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be
broadcast to the world."21 2 Similarly, the court held that the
same caller is entitled to assume that the numbers dialed in the
privacy of her home will also remain private except for the legit-
imate business use of the phone company. 213 The caller does not
206. 450 A.2d 952 (N.J. 1982).
207. See id.
208. See id. at 953.
209. See id.
210. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). The Hunt court stated that "the equities so strongly
favor protection of a person's privacy interest that we should apply our own stan-
dard rather than defer to the spirit of the federal provision." Hunt, 450 A.2d at
955.
211. Id. at 956.
212. Hunt, 450 A.2d at 956 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352
(1967)).
213. See Hunt, 450 A.2d at 956.
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distinguish between the telephone numbers she dialed and the
conversation she carries on afterwards in determining the
amount of privacy she can reasonably expect. "Telephone calls
cannot be made except through the telephone company's prop-
erty and with payment to it for service. This disclosure has
been necessitated because of the nature of the instrumentality
"214
Similarly, in State v. Gunwall,215 the Supreme Court of
Washington held that the police conducted an unreasonable
search when they placed a pen register on the defendant's tele-
phone line without a search warrant.216 The court held that do-
ing so was comparable in impact to electronic eavesdropping
devices because "it is continuing in nature, may affect other per-
sons and can involve multiple invasions of privacy ... "217
The Supreme Court of Colorado has recognized a person's
legitimate expectation of privacy in both her telephone records
and her bank statements. 218 In doing so, the court held that the
voluntary disclosure of financial information to the bank and of
dialed telephone numbers to the phone company are unavoida-
ble consequences to the use of those services.219 Information
learned through conducting a financial transaction with the
bank is "a mere by-product of the depositor's major purpose of
utilizing the bank as a vehicle for fund transfers and was not a
true disclosure to a third person such as would vitiate the de-
positor's reasonable expectation of privacy in the information
....220 Similarly, the court viewed the disclosure of telephone
numbers as a necessary step to "using the telephone as a means
of communication and the telephone company's method of de-
termining the cost of the service utilized."221
214. Id.
215. 720 P.2d 808 (Wash. 1986).
216. See id. at 814.
217. Id. at 816.
218. See Charnes v. DiGiacomo, 612 P.2d 1117 (Colo. 1980) (rejecting the
holding of United States v. Miller by recognizing a bank depositor's reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in checks and deposit slips given to the bank for the purpose of
conducting their financial business); see also People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135
(Colo. 1983) (rejecting the holding of Smith v. Maryland and recognizing that tele-
phone subscribers have an actual privacy expectation in the numbers they dial).
219. See Charnes, 612 P.2d at 1124; see also Sporleder, 666 P.2d at 144.
220. Sporleder, 666 P.2d at 140.
221. Id. at 141.
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This analysis can be applied to the discarding of one's
trash. Putting one's trash on the curb is a necessary step in
complying with many local laws that prohibit the discarding of
trash in any other fashion. Further, it is necessary for the
health and safety of society. If everyone allowed refuse to col-
lect in their homes, people would not be living in clean, healthy
environments. Placing the trash at the curb specifically for gar-
bage collectors is a means to achieve this end.
The court in People v. Sporleder222 held that society is pre-
pared to recognize as reasonable a person's privacy interest in
the telephone numbers that they dial. 223 The telephone com-
pany, according to the court, is in the business of providing con-
sumers with the means to participate in an electronic age.224
However, the government is in the business of investigating
crimes. 225 Thus, a person's reasonable expectation of privacy
that such information will not be randomly, without legal pro-
cess, supplied to the government, is according to the court, "emi-
nently reasonable."226
VII. Conclusion
"[Wihat [a person] seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally pro-
tected."227 While in 1967 the Supreme Court held that the Con-
stitution protected "people, not places,"228 the Court has not
held true to its word. Instead, the Court has chipped away at
citizens' Fourth Amendment rights by analogizing what a per-
son might be forced to reveal to a third person for a specific
business purpose to a bullhorn announcement of that informa-
tion in Times Square. The Court has effectively given the police
unlimited discretion in deciding when and whether to look
through a person's trash, seize the financial statements that she
must disclose to her bank in order to obtain a mortgage or pay
her bills, and monitor the telephone numbers she dials from the
222. 666 P.2d 135 (Colo. 1983).
223. See id. at 144.
224. See id. at 142.
225. See id.
226. Id.
227. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
228. Id.
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privacy of her own home. Common sense dictates that in order
for a citizen to avoid such invasive governmental intrusion, she
must store her trash within the walls of her home, keep all of
her money under her mattress, and refrain from using the tele-
phone to contact anyone.
Despite the protection that the Fourth Amendment grants
to our citizens: the right for "people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures;"229 and, the pronouncement in Katz that the
Fourth Amendment protects "people, not places,"'2 30 a person ad-
hering to local laws by placing her trash at the curb, calling her
doctor, or depositing money in her bank account, can no longer
reasonably expect that police will not be monitoring these
activities.
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229. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
230. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
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